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ABSTRACT 
An attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the solution of the Sleeping Beauty Problem in 
the framework of the Many-Worlds Interpretation led to a new controversy regarding the 
Quantum Sleeping Beauty Problem. We apply the concept of a measure of existence of a world 
and reach the solution known as ‘thirder’ solution which differs from Peter Lewis’s ‘halfer’ 
assertion. We argue that this method provides a simple and powerful tool for analysing rational 
decision theory problems. 
 
1. Quantum Sleeping Beauty controversy 
The Sleeping Beauty Problem (SBP) (Elga 2000, Lewis 2001) inflamed an ongoing 
controversy amongst researchers in rational Bayesian decision theory. One group claimed that in 
a certain coin toss scenario, Beauty must have credence one-third for Heads, while another group 
argued for one-half, with no clear consensus on a solution in sight (Pust 2011, Thorn 2011). Lev 
Vaidman (2001) proposed to consider the SBP within the framework of the Many-Worlds 
Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (MWI). He argued that treating the issue of probability in 
the MWI using the concept of the measure of existence of a world, makes the SBP simpler, 
yielding the thirder solution. A few years later, Peter Lewis (2007) also suggested solving the 
  
SBP within the MWI framework. He, however, argued for the halfer solution. This prompted a 
response by David Papineau and Víctor Durà-Vilà (2009a), followed by an exchange of replies 
(Lewis 2009, Papineau and Durà-Vilà 2009b). Other authors made subsequent contributions to 
the controversy (Peterson 2011, Bradley 2011, Tappenden 2011, Wilson 2013) proposing some 
modified scenarios.  
Peter Lewis introduced the Simplified SBP and put at the heart of his argument, its similarity 
to the Sleeping Pill Experiment (Vaidman 1998). Papineau and Durà-Vilà, the thirders, 
responded by questioning this similarity on metaphysical grounds. However, they argued that 
accepting this similarity and Vaidman’s approach leads to the halfer solution. Yet, we argue that 
Vaidman’s original suggestion of treating the SBP within the MWI framework using the concept 
of the measure of existence leads to a straightforward thirder solution, in spite of the strong 
similarity.  
2. From the measure of existence of a world to the illusion of probability 
In our view, there is no genuine probability in the MWI framework. It is a completely 
deterministic theory and there is no relevant information that an observer, preparing a quantum 
experiment, is ignorant about. The quantum state of the Universe at one time determines the 
quantum state at all times. Vaidman (1998) associated our everyday perception of probability 
with post-measurement ignorance. In his Sleeping Pill Experiment (SPE), the agent is given a 
sleeping pill and sleeps through a quantum measurement, which serves as a quantum coin toss. 
While asleep, she is moved to either room H or to an identical-looking room T, based on the 
result of the toss – Heads or Tails. Upon awakening, she is asked what her credence in Heads is. 
It is meaningless to ask the agent before the toss what is the probability to find herself in room H 
after the toss, since she is the ancestor of both future descendants. However, after the 
experiment, we can ask her descendant, in which room does she think she is. The fact that there 
is no direct meaning for the probability of the outcomes of the experiment, does not contradict a 
genuine uncertainty on the part of the two descendants upon awakening in the propositions ‘I am 
in the H-world’ and ‘I am in the T-world’.  
  
The illusion of probability follows from the identity between the quantum state of the 
hypothetical Collapse Universe and the quantum state of the corresponding world in the MWI 
Universe. An observer in a Collapse Universe, performing a sequence of experiments, will have 
the same memories as an observer in a MWI-Universe in a world with corresponding results. 
 In the MWI, the squared absolute value of the amplitude of a world is called its ‘measure of 
existence’.  The ‘behaviour principle’ teaches us that one should care about one’s descendants 
according to the measures of existence of their worlds, and thus functions as the Born Rule 
counterpart in the MWI. Paul Tappenden (2011) has named this the Born-Vaidman Rule. As it is 
stated in (Vaidman 1998): `The relative measures of existence of the worlds into which the world 
splits provide the concept of probability' 
In this paper, we accept the Born-Vaidman rule and show how it helps to analyse the SBP in a 
straightforward way. Note that an alternative approach which assigns a pre-branching uncertainty 
(Saunders and Wallace 2008), does not lead to a different conclusion. The analysis in that 
framework, however, does not benefit from the advantages of our deterministic approach. 
3. The Simplified Sleeping Beauty Problem versus the Sleeping Pill Experiment 
In Peter Lewis’s Simplified SBP, Beauty goes to sleep on Sunday evening. The researchers 
wake her up twice – once on Monday and once on Tuesday. Upon each awakening, Beauty is 
asked about her degree of belief in the proposition ‘This is the Monday awakening’. Beauty’s 
task becomes non-trivial because she forgets the Monday awakening completely, due to a 
memory erasure pill given to her before she goes back to sleep. Lewis argued that Beauty’s 
subjective experience is very similar to the experience of the agent awakened in one of the rooms 
in the SPE.  
There is a strong case for the similarity advocated by Lewis. What unifies both scenarios is 
the fact that Beauty’s subjective uncertainty takes place on the background of objective certainty. 
The researchers possess full information throughout the experiment and do not share Beauty’s 
ignorance. The effect of the memory erasure pill in the simplified SBP makes Beauty’s 
experience identical to that of the agent in the SPE. Beauty ought to have the same degree of 
  
belief in the propositions ‘This is the Monday awakening’ as in the corresponding proposition ‘I 
am in the H-world’. Henceforth we identify Beauty with both experiments. 
In the Simplified SBP, there is only one branch with which we can therefore associate a 
measure of existence 1. It is the same for Monday and Tuesday, so Beauty should attribute equal 
credences to both options, which thus have to be ½. In the SPE, the quantum state of the world 
upon Beauty’s awakening is 
    
 
  
    
 
  
      
and the measure of existence of each branch is ½. From the equality of the measures of existence 
it follows that Beauty should attribute credence ½ again.  
The measures of existence of the worlds upon Beauty awakenings are equal for the two 
alternatives in Lewis’s case as well as in the SPE, but different between the two cases, see Figure 
1. Like Papineau and Durà-Vilà we think that this is relevant for the solution, however, we 
disagree when they attribute certainty to the Monday and Tuesday awakenings, but credences of 
½ to the H and T results. They seem to confuse an external observer’s and Beauty’s points of 
view. An external observer cannot assign credence ½ for Beauty being in H or T world. Only 
Beauty possesses credence of ½ for these events, but she, upon awakening, also has credence ½ 
for Monday and for Tuesday. 
  
 
Figure 1: World lines in the Simplified Sleeping Beauty Problem (a) and in the 
Sleeping Pill Experiment (b). The width of the lines represents the measures of 
existence of corresponding worlds. The bright areas correspond to awakenings. 
4. The Quantum Sleeping Beauty Problem 
In the full SBP setup, Beauty goes to sleep on Sunday. She knows that a fair coin will be 
tossed while she is asleep. If the coin lands Tails, then as in the Simplified SBP, she will be 
awakened once on Monday and once on Tuesday, without having on Tuesday any memory of the 
previous awakening. If the coin lands Heads, then Beauty is awakened on Monday only. Upon 
each awakening, she is asked for her credence in the proposition ‘The coin has landed Heads’. 
Adam Elga (2000) argued that her credence should be ⅓, while David Lewis (2001) argued for 
½. Since then, philosophers have been divided between halfers and thirders. In an attempt to 
resolve the controversy, Vaidman (2001) proposed to use a quantum coin and to consider the 
problem within the MWI framework. He deduced the thirder solution. Peter Lewis (2007) also 
addressed the quantum SBP (QSBP) in the MWI framework. However, based on the similarity 
discussed in the previous section, he replaced the double awakening in the full SBP with a SPE, 

































Let us analyse the two scenarios using the concept of the measure of existence. We start with 
the analysis of the branches of the original full QSBP experiment. With an obvious notation, the 
wavefunction on Monday is 
           
 
  
             
 
  
                
and the wavefunction on Tuesday is 
           
 
  
              
 
  
                 
Upon awakening, Beauty knows that she is in one of three possible events: either it is Monday 
and the coin landed Heads (    ), or Monday and Tails (    ), or Tuesday and Tails (    ). 
The measures of existence of the corresponding branches are equal, see Figure 2(a). Since only 
one of the events corresponds to Heads, her credence in Heads should be (Vaidman 2001): 
      
       















   




Figure 2: (a) World lines in the original Sleeping Beauty Problem. The measures of 
existence of worlds H and T are ½. (b) World lines in Lewis’s version of the Sleeping 
Beauty Problem. The measures of existence of the world H is ½ and of the worlds TH 
and TT are ¼. The bright areas correspond to awakenings. 
 
In Lewis’s version of the experiment, in the case of the Tails result, another coin is tossed. If 
the second coin lands Heads, Beauty is awaken only on Monday, and if Tails – only on Tuesday. 
The wavefunction on Monday is  
          
 
  
             
 
 
               
 
 
                 
and on Tuesday is 
           
 
  
              
 
 
                
 
 
                  
Again, upon awakening, Beauty knows that she is in one of three possible events 
corresponding to H, TH and TT results. However, the measures of existence of the branches are 
not equal: they are ½, ¼ and ¼ respectively, see Figure 2(b). Therefore, in Lewis’s double-coin 






















      
       















   
 The similarity between the Simplified SBP and the SPE advocated by Lewis holds as long as 
one considers the two setups in isolation. However, the difference in the absolute measures of 
existence of the alternative worlds in the two cases explains why the two setups cannot be treated 
as equivalent when used as a part of a larger experiment. 
Our calculations are consistent with Peterson (2011), who, using Dutch book arguments, 
reached a thirder solution in the classical SBP, and a halfer solution in Lewis’s double-coin 
setup. Peterson, however, does not question the validity of Lewis’s modification of the QSBP. 
Our method can be applied to other variations of SBP. For example, in Bradley’s (2011) 
‘Technicolour’ SBP, in addition to the original procedure, Beauty is shown a coloured flag upon 
each awakening. For Heads, Red or Blue are shown at random with equal probabilities. For 
Tails, Red is shown on Monday and Blue on Tuesday. Bradley argued that Beauty’s credence in 
Heads should be ½, independently of the colour she sees. Although we agree with Bradley that 
the credence in Heads is independent of the colour of the flag, we, like Alastair Wilson (2013), 
believe that Bradley is mistaken regarding the value of the credence. 
To analyse this problem within the MWI, we introduce a second coin toss in the H-world (see 
Figure 3). Upon awakening, Beauty knows she is in one of four possible events: HHMon(Red), 
HTMon(Blue), TMon(Red) and TTue(Blue). The measures of existence of the branches 
corresponding to HHMon(Red) and HTMon(Blue) are ¼, while the branch associated with the other 
two events has measure ½. Thus, upon awakening, but before Beauty sees the flag, her credence 
in Heads should be: 
      
                 





















   
Once Beauty knows the colour, say, ‘Red’, the only viable options are the two Red awakenings: 
          
        












   
  
Seeing a Blue flag yields the same result. Thus, Beauty’s credence in Heads in the Technicolour 
SBP before or after she sees the flag should be ⅓, and not ½ as argued by Bradley. 
 
Figure 3: World lines of the ‘Technicolour’ Sleeping Beauty Problem. The measure of 
existence of the first coin T–branch is ½, while those of the two H-branches are ¼. R 
and B indicate the red and blue flag colours on the corresponding awakenings.  
5. The nature of a fair coin 
In the original SBP, Adam Elga and David Lewis did not discuss the nature of the fair coin. 
They considered it as a random variable with two equiprobable possible values, viewing the 
random variable as a primitive of classical probability theory. Vaidman (2001) used a quantum 
experiment as a fair coin, without analysing it in detail. Wilson (2013) suggested that the nature 
of the coin might matter (he distinguished between a ‘random’ coin and a ‘mathematical’ coin, 
see §7) and since a particular (quantum) implementation of the fair coin is crucial for our 
analysis, we have to justify Vaidman's move. 
There is no place for a random variable in classical physics: knowing all the details about a 
system at a specific time, allows us to predict its future with certainty. In fact, it is standard 


































al. 2010). Without quantum mechanics or some hypothetical new theory which has chancy 
events in its foundation, we cannot toss a coin in a genuinely chancy way. However, we can 
implement a fair coin based on the ignorance of the agent. Instead of deciding upon the result of 
a coin toss on which we cannot rely, one party hides the coin in one of her hands and asks the 
other party to choose the hand. 
In our experiment we use two identical boxes, A and B, with a single ball hidden inside. On 
Sunday, Beauty marks the box which will be opened after she falls asleep. The researchers 
subsequently open the marked box. We define as ‘Heads’ the event of finding the ball in the 
marked box, otherwise – ‘Tails’. Since Beauty herself chooses which box to mark without 
having any a priori knowledge about the location of the ball, this setup serves as a classical fair 
coin. A team of referees ensures that there is no less and no more than one ball in the boxes. 
To implement a quantum coin, we use a quantum particle as the ‘ball’, and create the particle 
in a superposition of being in the two boxes, say,      
 
  
         . The relative phase is 
not relevant so the state      
 
  
          is good too. In the framework of standard 
quantum mechanics, we have introduced randomness: no one knows the outcome of the quantum 
experiment even after Beauty had made her choice.  
There are two separate issues to address. First, Beauty’s credence does not change with the 
replacement of a classical coin by a quantum coin. Second, Beauty’s belief in the MWI instead 
of the standard quantum mechanics does not change her credence regarding the outcomes of the 
quantum experiment.  
Let us first address the second issue. There is a broad agreement among physicists that there is 
no current or foreseeable future technology which will allow one to perform an experiment 
distinguishing between the MWI and Collapse interpretations (Vaidman 2002). An observable 
change in Beauty’s credence in the QSBP experiment would constitute an example of such an 
experiment and thus we find it unlikely. Moreover, in the framework of the decision theory, 
Greaves and Myrvold (2010) argued that a believer in the MWI should make the same rational 
decisions as an agent who believes in a Collapse theory.  
  
Let us now turn to the first issue. We will adopt here the standard approach in which every 
quantum measurement ends with a single outcome. We will also rely on a well-established 
physical principle according to which superluminal signaling is impossible. This will rule out an 
observable change in Beauty’s credence, when the classical coin is replaced with a quantum 
coin. To prove our point we introduce a quantum state in which the location of the ball (box A or 
B) is entangled with a spin-state of an ancillary spin-½ particle located in a faraway region: 
       
 
  
                    
If the faraway experimenter does not touch the spin particle, then it is again an experiment with 
quantum randomness. Moreover, measuring the spin in the x direction will put the ball into one 
of the superpositions      
or     : 
       
 
 
               
 
 
               
 
  
                   
           
            
    
    
 , 
which leads to the quantum experiment described above. However, measuring the spin in the z 
direction reduces the ball’s state into one of the localized states    
 
or    , which leads to the 
classical coin experiment: After Beauty’s choice the outcome of the coin toss is determined. 
Thus, an experimenter who performs a spin measurement in a faraway region, can 
instantaneously affect the nature of the Sleeping Beauty experiment: quantum or classical. So if 
there were a real difference between the two, he could send signals to Beauty faster than light! 
6. The operational meaning of Beauty’s credence 
We have relied on the impossibility of superluminal signaling to rule out a ‘real’ difference in 
Beauty’s credence between the quantum and classical cases.  It cannot be just a semantic issue 
(as Groisman (2008) argued the difference between Adam Elga’s and David Lewis approaches to 
be).  Beauty’s credence has to be observable. 
Following de Finetti (1974), we identify credence with readiness to place a bet. Then we can test 
our theory by repeating the process many times and counting the amount of money Beauty gains 
(or loses). As has been noted many times before, when Beauty places bets on every awakening, 
  
she will be richer (on average) placing bets on Tails. It might seem that the rules of the game are 
unfair: Beauty gets advantage for Tails since she plays twice and thus gets a double amount of 
money in the case of Tails. Let us correct this by asking Beauty to place her bets only in one of 
the Tails awakenings. In this case she will not gain money with any strategy. This allegedly 
supports the halfer position.  
Nevertheless, we still hold to our claim that on each awakening Beauty has credence one-third 
for Heads. If she herself could offer bets to a third party, she would do it according to a thirder 
approach. But when she is offered bets by the researcher who – as she knows – approaches her 
for every Heads, but only for half of Tails, she gets new information which changes her credence 
in Heads from ⅓ to ½. 
7. Mathematical Sleeping Beauty 
In Wilson’s (2013) variant of the SBP – the Mathematical Sleeping Beauty (MSB) – the coin 
toss is replaced by Beauty’s uncertainty regarding the truth of a mathematical proposition. 
Instead of marking the box, she chooses how the researchers should associate ‘true’ and ‘false’ 
with ‘Heads’ and ‘Tails’, which specify the awakenings pattern in the SBP. It is assumed that 
Beauty has no relevant mathematical training so that on Sunday she has credence ½ for ‘true’ 
and ½ for ‘false’. Upon each awakening, Beauty is asked for her credence in the truth of the 
proposition. 
While Wilson argued for the answer ⅓ in the SBP, he advocated the halfer solution to the 
MSB. We, however, attribute a thirder solution to the MSB as well. We see no essential 
difference between the MSB and the SBP with a classical coin toss: in both cases there is a 
definite result that Beauty is not aware of. This uncertainty follows from either the lack of 
mathematical education, or her ignorance about the contents of the opaque boxes. Wilson built 
his argument on the difference between a classical chancy event and the definite truth value of a 
mathematical proposition. In our view, however, there are no chancy classical events: the result 
of any classical experiment is defined by the initial condition of the Universe. In any way, 
according to our analysis, for fair coins of all types only the thirder solution applies. 
  
We can apply our method also if Beauty were a mathematician and had a priori knowledge 
regarding the truth of the theorem, say, credence p on Sunday in it being ‘true’. Upon awakening, 
her credence should change to 
 
        
 
 
   
 in case she has chosen ‘true’ equals ‘Heads’, or to 
  
        
 
  
   
 otherwise. Note that if Beauty is certain that the theorem is true (or false), her 
credence does not change. 
Our analysis of the MSB helps to demonstrate the information transfer between the 
researchers and Beauty: While on Sunday Beauty is ignorant about the truth of the mathematical 
proposition, the researchers are not. Beauty understands that awakenings serve as evidence and 
thus, in the middle of the week, Beauty has more knowledge regarding the truth of the 
proposition. Similarly, in the original SBP she has more knowledge about the presence of a ball 
inside the box she marked.  
8. Conclusions 
We have demonstrated that the concept of the measure of existence of a world in the MWI 
provides an unambiguous solution to the QSBP. Contrary to the assertion of Peter Lewis, it is a 
thirder solution. We have argued that changing the nature of the coin cannot have any observable 
effects: in particular, there should not be a difference between Beauty’s credences in the QSBP 
and the original classical SBP. Considering definite splitting of worlds in the MWI instead of 
uncertain outcomes provides a simple and powerful tool for analysing rational decision theory 
problems and, specifically, it can be applied to all setups discussed in the context of the SBP. 
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